Organized and unorganized workers in the United States have been struggling for well over a century to obtain safe and healthy working conditions. The 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act was an important landmark in the effort of working men and women to enhance the quality of working life by increasing workers' physical, psychological and economic security. From the advent of state safety laws through the passage of workmen's compensation laws to the enactment of the OSH Act, organized labor consistently agitated for strong preventive legislation to reduce accidents and the incidence of occupational diseases. Opposition to rigorous health and safety legislation came from businessmen, as well as from experts and politicians concerned with maintaining business prosperity. A historical overview helps to explain the glacial pace at which business and government responded to worker demands for the prevention of occupational accidents and diseases.
EARLY STATE SAFETY LAWS
Until the 1930s individual states rather than Congress debated and enacted most workers'-safety and income-maintenance legislation, such as workmen's compensation and widows' pension laws. Because jurisprudence and legislation varied from state to state, businessmen expressed both legitimate and exaggerated fears that advances in safety standards and accident compensation would handicap them in their competition with entrepreneurs in states with less stringent laws. The consequences of federalism frequently were weak safety legislation and administrative caution or sabotage of the effective parts of the health and safety laws adopted by legislatures.
Between 1877, when Massachusetts passed the first state factory inspection law, and 1900, many American states created primitive industrial safety inspection systems. They were generally understaffed. Inspectors often lacked legal authority to enter the workplace, and the fines assessed for violation of the state safety codes were too low to provide employers with a financial incentive to comply with the regulations.
The strongest safety laws of this era applied to miners in Pennsylvania and Illinois and reflected the economic and political militancy of mine unions. Pennsylvania's 1885 statute led to the creation of an unusually large force of mine inspectors-twenty-four-by 1893, who were required to inspect each mine every three months and post the results in clear view of the miners [2] . The minimum fine for safety violations was $200. The 1885 law authorized mine inspectors to ask a state district court to stop work at mines where severe, imminent danger existed. But the effectiveness of this last provision was diluted by the personal liability of the inspector for court costs if his case for closure did not convince the sitting judge. By 1900 the United Mine Workers Journal urged unsuccessfully that because appointed inspectors were politically vulnerable, the legislature should replace them with coal miners elected by the miners of each inspection district [3] .
The men and women who labored in hazardous work environments knew that their own initiatives often were the most effective way of minimizing occupational hazards. In especially dangerous trades like mining and lumbering, workers frequently used brief job actions and wildcat strikes to force employers to correct conditions that threatened imminent injury and death. For example, miners might refuse to return to a mine until the operators sank extra escape shafts. In 1909 bituminous coal miners in the vicinity of Pittsburgh staged wildcat strikes to protest the use of a dangerous new blasting powder [4] . Lumber workers and coal miners usually stopped working for the day when a fellow worker was killed in an accident. Coal miners had a custom of not waiting for authorization to vacate a mine when they believed an explosion or cave-in threatened. Traditionally, when a miner knocked over the "waste" bucket he was signaling everyone in the vicinity to flee immediately.
Although any group of workers could stage a wildcat strike, strong union organization was necessary to prevent employer retaliation against workers who acted aggressively to preserve their health and safety. Describing the findings of a coroner's jury on the causes of a 1914 mining accident, the United Mine Workers Journal caustically remarked that the jury's verdict should have been "Death was due to lack of organization" [5] .
Skilled workers often exercised considerable influence over the rhythm and pace of production and the actual layout of the workplace. Because of this, they could take some action to promote safety, although they were often caught in a bind between health and safety concerns and their desire to maximize earnings, especially during "rush periods" when work and overtime opportunities were plentiful. Employers often threatened to fire workers who did not work at a pace fast enough to meet production standards, even if the only way workers could comply with management's demands was by not fully complying with safety procedures. Zinc and lead miners were often given a Hobson's choice: if they chose to spend time on safety by watering down mine faces being cut by machines that produced large amounts of rock and metallic dust, they would lose earnings, since miners were paid by the weight of the ore they mined, not the number of hours they labored.
Workers clearly had no legal power to install safety technologies in the workplace and lacked the financial resources to buy expensive equipment like ventilation fans. Worker organizations rarely had enough collective bargaining power to force manufacturers to adopt less hazardous, but more costly, chemicals and materials for industrial processes. Thus, unionized hatters could not compel their employers to eliminate the use of poisonous mercury salts; the hatters' adaptive response, where they had enough bargaining clout, was to allow men and women in the trade to take rest periods and absences from work to recover from the debilitating effects of exposure to toxic mercury fumes.
Similarly, unionized bakers enhanced their health by negotiating a workday shorter than that of non-union workers, while hard-rock miners' unions in the western mountain states agitated for eight-hour-day legislation, which they expected to reduce both the fatigue that led to mistakes and accidents and the time miners were exposed to toxic dusts and chemical fumes [6] .
THE EMERGENCE OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Theoretically, American workers who believed that the negligence of their employers had caused them injury were free to sue them for damages. But there is abundant documentation of the dismissal and blacklisting of injured workers who exercised their legal rights. Fellow workers who witnessed accidents and might have testified to the negligence of employers and the lack of any contributory negligence on the part of the injured were often threatened with reprisals if they told the truth at coroners' inquests or in court. Nevertheless, many injured workers filed suit for damages from their employers, especially when there was abundant evidence of gross managerial negligence [7] .
State judges developed common-law doctrines of industrial torts in the 1840s to protect America's budding industries against excessive and unpredictable business costs. These judicial rules severely limited the ability of injured workers or their dependents to sue negligent employers for the loss of income resulting from industrial accidents. Judges used these doctrines to justify denying juries a chance to hear injured workers' complaints-a practice of great importance since juries almost always sympathized with the plight of injured workers and awarded them damages [8] .
During the first decade of the twentieth century many state court judges began narrowing the common-law defenses they tendered to employers, allowing juries to try more negligence suits brought by injured workers. Judicial opinion was changing in reaction to the larger size and stability of major American businesses and because judges worried about the growing, often strident criticism of the inequities of the legal system, especially its evident Achilles heel, the common law of industrial torts, which was condemned by labor leaders, reformist lawyers and socialist politicians. As the first decade of the twentieth century advanced, increasing numbers of injured workers filed suit against negligent employers, casualty insurance rates increased and state legislatures began passing laws that stripped employers of more and more of their common-law defenses against tort actions brought by injured wage earners [9] .
Starting in the 1880s, organized labor began vigorous legislative lobbying for employers' liability laws that removed parts of employers' common-law defenses against the tort actions initiated by injured wage-earners. Working men and women understood that large settlements paid to injured workers by negligent employers would not only provide sorely needed financial relief to the injured and their dependents but would also give employers a major financial incentive to take action to make the work environment safer. Fighting against adamant employer opposition, labor initially obtained few significant employers' liability laws, except for railroad workers, who benefitted from public antipathy towards railroads. By 1910, however, many large and mediumsized employers had become convinced that they should support workmen's compensation legislation [10] .
American Federation of Labor President Samuel Gompers also turned to workmen's compensation, despite his advocacy of voluntarism which resisted state paternalism in favor of worker protection through union-financed benefit programs. Union compensation funds had one basic weakness: they provided no financial incentives to employers to promote occupational safety. Workmen's compensation made employers covered by the compensation laws financially responsible for at least part of the losses incurred by injured workers [11] .
Tragically, the initial state compensation laws enacted between 1910 and 1917 omitted most farm workers and domestic workers, the latter mainly women, as well as workers of small companies of one to five employees. These laws did not explicitly define occupational diseases as compensable. By the end of the 1920s, court decisions and legislative action in a small minority of states gave compensation to some workers for a limited number of occupational diseases [12] .
Compensation laws involved a quid pro quo that generally made sense to unions and workers. In exchange for a fixed schedule of payments and the assumption of accident liability by businesses, even when management was not demonstrably responsible for an accident, workers lost their right to sue negligent employers for large, punitive verdicts. The cap fixed compensation schedules put on employer financial liability, however, meant that an employer might decide that very costly safety devices and procedures were more expensive than paying out money to injured workers. Only a small number of state legislatures tried to deal with this problem. New York, Ohio, Texas, Oregon, Maryland, Arizona and New Hampshire allowed workers injured because of gross employer negligence or violation of safety laws to accept compensation and sue for additional damages; Wisconsin and Washington affixed a fifteen per cent surcharge to the compensation of workers injured as a consequence of violation of a safety law. The limitation of financial penalties for gross negligence and the total failure to provide any criminal penalties for negligent persons seriously limited the preventive potential of accident compensation systems. These shortcomings especially discouraged the prevention of occupational disease where compensation statutes covered them, because in many instances the costs of preventing occupational diseases were much higher than the costs of preventing accidents [13] .
Between 1909 and 1913, when most industrial states established commissions to draft workmen's compensation laws, they also closely scrutinized their factory inspection systems. Union officials, middle-class safety experts, concerned legislators and some astute businessmen concluded that everywhere in the United States safety inspection forces were understaffed, underpaid and poorly trained. Inspection systems were flawed because safety laws made fines for their violation discretionary and did not establish timetables for correcting hazardous conditions. Inspectors who found workplaces in violation of safety laws usually hesitated to assess fines. Multiple warnings were the rule, not the exception.
It was not the state factory inspection systems but workmen's compensation that organized labor viewed as the most effective way to induce employers to pay more attention to workplace safety [14] . Of course, union leaders did not ignore the preventive potential of worksite inspection when it was combined with admonitions that accidents would result in certain payment of compensation benefits [15] . This was the main strategy adopted by the Industrial Commission of Wisconsin in 1912 and endorsed, in principle, by the Wisconsin State Federation of Labor (WSFL). To augment the preventive effects of workmen's compensation, the Wisconsin law required that compensation insurance premiums be determined by means of "schedule rating"; while each employer paid a premium based largely on the accident record of similarly classified businesses, an additional part of the insurance premium would be based on the employer's record of compliance with state safety codes. If an inspector from the Industrial Commission cited a firm for code violations, the firm's schedule rating would be increased [16] .
From the inception of the "Wisconsin system," however, the state's labor unions publicly complained about hazards that were not covered by the state's factory code, about safety standards that were less stringent than those proposed by labor and about lax enforcement of codes dealing with ventilation and paint fumes. A recent analysis of the records of the Wisconsin Industrial Commission indicates that to maintain cordial relations with employers, so that they would be receptive to the safety recommendations and stipulations of the Industrial Commission, inspectors sometimes did not write up all code violations. If a worker was subsequently injured as a consequence of such an unrecorded violation, the financial penalties of the Wisconsin law could not be applied [17] . By the 1930s the WSFL had become disillusioned with the inspection and penalty approach and lobbied successfully for a switch to experience rating for workmen's compensation insurance. Thus an employer's insurance costs would increase as a consequence of every accident, especially costly accidents, irrespective of whether a code violation had taken place or not [18] .
It appears that many large firms in the years between 1910 and the Depression responded to the advent of compensation by installing more safety appliances on their machinery. Many companies also established safety training programs for workers and managers. But the limitations of compensation also became apparent. Workers' compensation benefits failed to keep up with inflation, despite constant lobbying by labor organizations to expand the real value of these awards [19] . State compensation law coverage for occupational diseases expanded very slowly. In a few instances workers' compensation systems were severely hamstrung by drastic administrative sabotage. In Ohio the state's workmen's compensation insurance fund accumulated a large surplus ($7,200,000 in the mid-1960s) while denying payments to many injured workers. In South Carolina in the 1940s and early 1950s, pro-business administrators of the state's industrial commission also refused to award legally mandated compensation to large numbers of injured workers [20] .
Throughout the twentieth century, constitutional restrictions plagued the efforts of those who sought effective income maintenance and workplace safety programs for workers. Compulsory state workmen's compensation laws, which would have avoided many lapses in the coverage of employers and workers, were not ruled constitutional by the United States Supreme Court until 1917. Until the late 1930s, national compensation laws were viewed as a pipe dream by all concerned parties. Even in the mid-1950s, proponents of national standards for state compensation systems were worried about the constitutionality of their proposals [21] .
LABOR AND EARLY FEDERAL INVOLVEMENT IN WORKPLACE HEALTH AND SAFETY
The federal government was not totally removed from the arena of accident compensation and workplace safety. The Interstate Commerce Commission had regularly collected statistics on railroad accidents and had been involved in the passage of legislation requiring air brakes (1893) on railroad cars. The United States Bureau of Mines had been established in 1910 to conduct research on and propagate information about mine safety. In 1915 Congress passed the LaFollette Seamen's Act; Congress also passed employers' liability laws for interstate railroad workers and compensation laws for federal employees and longshoremen. These laws did not cover occupational diseases and provided for minimal safety inspections. In the 1930s the United Mine Workers of America lobbied hard in Congress for strict national safety codes that would be enforced by the Bureau of Mines. Not until 1941, however, did the Bureau of Mines receive any inspection authority, and the bureau had no power to set and enforce standards until 1952. In 1936 Congress passed the Walsh-Healey Act, which included a section that authorized the secretary of labor to promulgate safety standards for firms doing more than $10,000 of business yearly with the federal government. Lack of adequate funding vitiated the potential of this law to advance workplace safety. As late as 1969 the government inspected fewer than five per cent of the 75,000 firms covered by Walsh-Healey [22] .
During the 1930s Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, who had become an expert on industrial hazards and workers' compensation during her long tenure on the New York State Industrial Commission (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) , charted an unprecedented course of activism for the Division of Labor Standards (DLS) of the United States Department of Labor. The DLS promoted trade union organization because it understood that organized workers had a better chance of pressing management for workplace health and safety. The DLS also began providing information to union safety councils and other union bodies and training state health and safety inspectors.
After World War II, Perkins proposed legislation allowing the Department of Labor to assign federal experts to work in state labor departments and to require states that were receiving federal funds for their health and safety programs to conform to minimum federal safety requirements and safety education standards [23] . James Carey, secretary-treasurer and safety and health officer of the Congress of Industrial Organizations, supported Perkins' federalization scheme. Congress responded to business criticism of federal support for unions and hours, wage and safety standards by reducing the Division of Labor Standards' funding by almost forty percent [24] .
It is understandable that in the 1930s, as in previous decades, the majority of the time, energy and money of the nation's trade unions was devoted to union organizing and to securing legislation to allow workers maximum latitude to use the strike and boycott. But during the organizing drives of the 1930s labor leaders frequently criticized management insensitivity to the health and safety of workers and implied that building a strong union would give workers a better chance of obtaining corrective action. Consider this passage from a speech given by United Auto Workers (UAW) President Homer Martin in Cadillac Square, Detroit, on March 23, 1937:
The industrialists of this city, whether intentionally or unintentionally, have kept workers under conditions that have cost them in human life, in human health, and in human welfare. Last year one thousand men went to one hospital in the city of Detroit with lead poisoning from one factory here. The papers didn't tell you about that. Nobody knew about that because you had no organ, you had no organization which could tell you . . . [25] .
Between 1945 and 1955 the AFL and the CIO adopted divergent approaches to workplace health and safety. While the AFL lobbied hard for expanded appropriations to the states for occupational safety and health inspections and education, the CIO backed legislation, written by the staff of the UAW, that would have federalized workplace health and safety codes. In 1952 Congress gave serious consideration to these proposals. The Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare held hearings on the Murray bill, embodying the AFL approach. Also, Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey introduced a bill that would have established federal safety standards and a federal safety inspection agency [26] .
Disillusioned by the insufficient numbers of state inspectors, CIO unions backed federalization, hoping that the national government would fund more health and safety inspections. William Troestler, head of the UAW local at the Nash-Kelvinator plant in Kenosha, Wisconsin, explained that despite detailed state safety codes and the fifteen per cent compensation penalty if an accident occurred because a safety inspector's order had been ignored, Nash-Kelvinator had dragged its feet in correcting the most serious of ninety-seven code violations noted by a state inspector during the plant's last inspection. Only when the union used its contractual grievance procedures and "various means" of pressure did it convince the management of this large company to remedy the "sticky" problems, which involved industrial dust and lax safety procedures. Other union representatives testified to the total failure of Michigan to inspect its unusually hazardous copper mines and to the effectiveness of wildcat strikes such as the one at the Remington Rand factory in Ilion, New York, in securing quick elimination of health and safety hazards. Records of the UAW Indicate that between 1953 and 1957 unionized Ford Motor Company workers often staged wildcat strikes over poor ventilation, excess heat and intolerably cold factory conditions. In most instances management quickly corrected the work environment problems and did not discipline the wildcat strikers [27] .
Business spokesmen whose firms would be affected by the two health and safety bills under consideration by Congress in 1952 opposed both bills, urging continued reliance on private sector safety engineers and company personnel to remove workplace hazards. Ironically, in warning Congress about the high cost of federal health and safety initiatives, employer representatives candidly admitted that constant changes in work conditions required "full-time inspections by the individual on the job," that proper inspection often required one full-time inspector in each plant and that to accomplish its mission the Humphrey bill would require a force of 10,000 inspectors. (By contrast in 1970 the OSH Act and subsequent appropriations authorized about 1500 new health and safety inspectors.) [28] Senator Humphrey, New York Senator Herbert Lehman and CIO spokesmen argued for national health and safety standards because interstate economic competition would dilute safety efforts by the separate states. They recalled how the absence of national workers' compensation standards had led legislaturesin even the most liberal states, where organized labor had an effective lobby-to hold back on improving compensation so that their businessmen would not be handicapped vis-à-vis competitors in other states. Harry Read, assistant to CIO Secretary-Treasurer James B. Carey, summed up the feeling of workers on this problem, remarking: "We are making a god of competition, rather than paying due attention to human dignity" [29] .
CIO unions criticized the AFL bill (the Murray bill) but supported both bills. The AFL adamantly opposed the Humphrey bill. While this friction definitely complicated the task of Congress, federal inaction on the health and safety issue also reflected business lobbying, the opposition of self-interested state labor department officials, and the irresponsibility of the Truman administration and most of the Congress [30] .
It has become fashionable to say that during this time, most unions did not do enough in contract negotiations to advance workplace health and safety by getting standards written into contracts and by pressing for health and safety education [31] . This belief ignores the complexities of historical context. Available records suggest that many unions tried, failed and knew that they had failed in this regard. In 1955, Walter J. Mason of the AFL's National Legislative Committee discussed this issue with the Duluth, Minnesota, Chamber of Commerce.
Mason first noted that:
after the drive for safety and workmen's compensation legislation . . . , labor's interest in safety seems to have fallen off. This is not wholly true, although the struggle for mere existence which marked the history of labor in the 1920s and the early 1930s, and the preoccupation with organizing which continued in from the mid-thirties until World War II, did cause labor to concentrate mainly on other matters.
Mason then addressed the crux of the problem:
when someone asks about labor's lack of interest in safety, they are usually referring to labor's alleged "failure" . . . to cooperate with management and community safety activities. . . . That is putting the cart before the horse. The history of industrial relations in the United States clearly shows that broad groups of management have sternly resisted labor as a partner, in safety or in anything else. . . . Labor's absence from participation in many plant and community safety programs . . . stems directly from labor's exclusion from the effort. . . . I have heard [management representatives] rationalize their stubbornness on the grounds that since the safety program was effective long before there was a union in the plant, bringing the union into the picture would only complicate matters.
Mason urged employers to consider the utility of unions in the management of site safety, noting that "even the job of disciplining employees for infractions of safety rules becomes much easier, and much less a bone of contention, if the union has a hand in framing the rules."
Praising the World War II safety training programs of the Department of Labor, Mason noted that some unions had found their participation in such programs "blocked by management's refusal to cooperate" [32] . Similarly, in 1962 Paul R. Hutchins of the AFL-CIO Metal Trades Department complained that "We have found . . . that in the case of some large . . . corporations there is . . . an unwarranted desire on the part of management to hold unto itself the responsibility and administration of the safety function in the plant" [33] .
Management always had the upper hand in the realm of safety. As John McManigal, president of United Steelworkers of America (USWA) Local 1397, of Homestead, Pennsylvania, told Senate investigators in early 1970, safety rules negotiated with management had escape clauses that the union had never been able to eliminate: "Management reserves the right to suspend, alter amend or in any way it desires change any safety rule when production can be delayed, hindered or stopped" [34] . Employers regarded all attempts to reduce their control over the labor process and machine production as unwarranted. Worker and union initiatives on occupational safety and health were as unwelcome to employers as were worker attempts to unionize, to influence promotion and layoff policies and to determine the type of technology used for production, its rate of operation and its level of staffing.
Preventing occupational diseases posed even greater problems for unions. In some instances, there is no doubt that union leaders, like those of the UMWA after World War II, cut deals with management that traded off action to prevent diseases in return for higher pensions and wages. But union "quiescence" in agitating for the prevention of and compensation for occupational diseases usually had been caused by lack of knowledge about the etiology of occupational diseases. When sound scientific studies warning about specific occupational diseases were eventually published, previously "silent" union newspapers actively publicized the dangers. Wage earners also knew that safety laws or costly compensation coverage of occupational diseases could lead employers to close down their enterprises. To preserve their jobs workers sometimes chose to avoid confrontations about accidents or exposure to occupational diseases. For example, in the 1930s iron molders in Wisconsin even requested a fifty percent cut in silicosis benefits to avoid losing jobs to foundries in adjacent states [35] .
After 1947 many unions devoted considerable energy to fighting for repeal of the Taft-Hartley Act and to lobbying for a national health insurance plan. In the 1960s the AFL-CIO's time was consumed by efforts to get civil rights legislation, more public housing and Medicare/ Medicaid. The AFL-CIO was also lobbying vigorously for changes in national trade policy that would protect American jobs and to protect workers against President Lyndon Johnson's pressure on wage earners to accept his voluntary wage-restraint program. Under these circumstances, workplace health and safety was not a high-priority legislative issue for the AFL-CIO, which concentrated its resources on issues that had developed widespread public support or were essential to the basic survival of unions. Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the antagonism of the AFL and most state labor departments towards any expansion of the authority of the national government in the health and safety field did not decline until the late 1950s. This stand contributed to the delay in creating a federal agency empowered to set and enforce national health and safety standards [36] .
THE LONG ROAD TO A FEDERAL OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
The records of the AFL-CIO Department of Occupational Safety and Health, the transcripts of congressional hearings in the 1960s and the author's interview with former Assistant Secretary of Labor Esther Peterson indicate that in the mid-1960s, the Industrial Union Department-a CIO enclave within the AFL-CIO-and the United Steelworkers-a CIO union by origin-took the initiative in organizing lobbying for expanded federal action to promote occupational safety and health. In 1968 the AFL-CIO began vigorous congressional lobbying for the creation of a national health and safety agency [37] .
A constellation of developments led to the passage of the 1970 OSH Act. In the 1960s, university and hospital-based physicians and biochemists began to publish studies that were more objective than the investigations of company physicians, giving evidence of the role of industrial chemicals and metallic and fibrous airborne particles in causing occupational disease. The academic scientists often used union membership lists to trace suspected victims of occupational diseases with long-term gestation periods. The professions of industrial hygienist and occupational health specialist were expanding. And a rising environmental consciousness led to the formation or expansion of many middle-class groups that would provide essential support to the OSH Act during the 1970 showdown in the halls of Congress. This support was comparable to the backing middle-class social reformers gave to workmen's compensation legislation, improved safety and fire codes and better state inspection in the years between 1906 and 1917 [38] .
Debate Over the Adequacy of State-Level Regulation
By the late 1960s union and federal safety experts were publicizing the failure of most state laws and state labor department efforts to promote adequately preventive actions to reduce the incidence of occupational accidents and diseases. Reformers noted that in 1969 the nation had 1600 state safety inspectors and twice as many fish and game wardens. In Ohio and Texas inspectors could enter a workplace only after an accident had taken place; in California, in the absence of an investigation of an accident that had injured a worker, an employer could be inspected only if workers filed a formal complaint. Michigan's inspectors had to obtain a court order to make employers correct code violations [39] .
In Pennsylvania the Director of the State Labor Department's Division of Occupational Health refused to show workers the results of a survey his office had conducted related to air pollution in and around coke ovens, claiming that even though state funds had been used for the study, the United States Steel Corporation had to authorize release of the report. Eventually, the Legislative Committee of Pennsylvania of the United Steelworkers of America found a prominent Democratic legislator who intervened to obtain a copy of the report. This episode reveals the obstacles unions had to overcome just to obtain the information necessary to begin protecting the health and safety of workers [40] .
The Lyndon Johnson White House, particularly at the urging of Assistant Secretary of Labor Esther Peterson, pushed for national health and safety standards that would be enforced by a federal government agency. This was part of a broader strategy that relied on "social regulation" to bolster political support because it did not require the federal government to raise taxes for domestic spending at a time when the Vietnam War was eating up funds. In 1966 White House aide Joseph Califano took the lead in searching for such issues; accident and disease prevention appeared to fit the bill. Disgusted with the failure of the secretaries of both the Department of Labor and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to respond to White House requests for recommendations in the health and safety area, Califano, with the support of President Johnson, had the Bureau of the Budget draft a health and safety law. It was introduced in Congress in January 1968 [41] .
At this time, major business groups were virtually unanimous in their opposition to the proposals for federal inspection and standard-setting that were being circulated in the nation's capital. George Taylor, the economist who had become the AFL-CIO's expert on occupational diseases, could not find a single corporation industrial safety director who would back these two basic lines of action [42] . When the experts on the staff of the National Safety Council, an industry-dominated group, recommended backing federal action, the "executive board overruled them and lobbied for a limited program that left enforcement to the states" [43] .
Organized labor was led in its lobbying efforts by the USWA. George Taylor worked closely with USWA lobbyist John Sheehan, who started a wide-ranging effort to develop grass-roots support for an OSH Act, getting letter-writing campaigns going and arranging for steelworkers suffering from occupational diseases to testify before a congressional committee that held hearings in industrial communities [44] .
Union representatives appearing before the House Committee on Education and Labor in February and March 1968 had to deal with the argument, raised principally by Representative William A. Steiger (R-Wisconsin), that federal health and safety standards and federal inspection were unnecessary because unions could use collective bargaining to improve workers health and safety. The implication of this tact was that labor unions had failed to do their utmost to advance worker safety through non-governmental means. Some union spokesmen agreed that unions could make a greater effort to bargain for safety. But these witnesses also indicated that local and national unions often lacked the information and technical expertise to "bargain successfully at all times." These spokesmen detailed the continued opposition of most in management to even the most elementary safety measures. For example, Jack Suarez, Health and Safety Director of the International Union of Electrical Workers, alleged that in its Syracuse color television plant, General Electric refused to provide workers with radiation exposure badges [45] .
Most employers refused to accept procedures that would permit unions to quickly alert them about plant conditions affecting health and safety. Tony Mazzocchi of the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers testified that managers told him that "running a plant is their business and no one is going to tell them how to run a facility." Representative William D. Ford (D-Michigan), who had the best grasp of the health and safety issue of all the congressmen on the committee, admitted that management often refused to bargain on safety, despite the existence of Section 8A(5) of the Taft-Hartley Act, which legitimized this subject as a proper area for collective bargaining. Frank Burke, health and safety director of the USWA, argued that there was a severe problem with management's non-compliance with negotiated safety and health standards. Burke noted that the USWA's contract with the Bethlehem Steel Company allowed workers to request job transfers if they believed a severe, imminent hazard existed at their assigned job. But according to Burke, workers requesting relief were "sent home," not reassigned. The contract also stipulated that a worker requesting relief could not tell the replacement worker about the hazard. Grievance procedures were the only legal way for the union to fight management's contract violations. "They are bankrupting our local unions by forcing them into arbitration, arbitrating things that are written into the contract," exclaimed Burke [46] .
Granting workers the right to stage wildcat strikes over such safety issues was, Burke argued, the best way to enforce quickly contractual stipulations on health and safety [47] . Section 502 of the National Labor Relations Act stated that if employees quit work because of "abnormally dangerous conditions for work" they were not considered to have engaged in a strike. But this language clearly applied only to imminent, easily demonstrable hazards. The federal courts ruled that under the National Labor Relations Act unions were financially liable for wildcat strikes if collective bargaining agreements did not sanction wildcats. In 1947 the Taft-Hartley Act codified this liability [48] .
Neither the Johnson Administration, the administration of Richard Nixon, nor Congress was willing to support legislation allowing safety strikes when management would not correct serious hazards or violated negotiated health and safety procedures. In February 1969, the rank-and-file opposition movement within the United Mine Workers of America, fueled by anger against the lack of internal union democracy and by many miners' outrage over the failure of the states to compensate miners who contracted different forms of pulmonary (black lung) disease, staged massive wildcat strikes that disrupted coal mining in the Ohio, Pennsylvania and West Virginia bituminous coal fields for twentyfour days. The West Virginia legislature was forced to enact amendments to the state's compensation law that extended coverage for black lung disease, and Congress responded by passing a federal compensation law for victims of black lung disease. Because much of the financing of the national compensation system came from general U.S. tax revenues and fees assessed on western open pit mining companies, the preventive effect of this law was somewhat mitigated [49] .
Compromise and Resolution
By 1970 President Nixon endorsed some kind of occupational safety and health law. We are not privy to his thinking or to the exact attitude of his secretary of labor, George Schultz. Schultz appears to have wanted an effective law and fought others within the administration who sought to limit the power of the Department of Labor to adopt and revise toxic exposure standards and to subject all standards to a test of economic and technical feasibility. It seems likely that Nixon was concerned by the close margin of his 1968 victory over Hubert Humphrey and understood that a health and safety law would help garner the votes of blue collar workers. Recognizing the changed political climate, business lobbyists shifted their strategy. Instead of opposing any law, they attempted to dilute the effects that any forthcoming law would have on business autonomy and the cost of doing business [50] .
Complex negotiations between Congress, the executive branch, and labor and business representatives took place in 1970 as three bills, each amended as time passed, contended for final endorsement. Eventually the major objectives of organized labor were not fully realized because they were opposed by businesses, state labor and health department officials, and officials of the Nixon Administration.
By the mid-1960s AFL-CIO leaders had concluded that federal standards for workmen's compensation would increase the well-being of injured workers because more occupational diseases would probably be included under federal standards than was possible by lobbying in the state legislatures, thus expanding financial incentives for accident prevention and limiting workers' exposures to dangerous metals, powders, liquids and gasses. Strong opposition from the insurance industry and state compensation commission officials, however, convinced the Johnson administration to oppose federal compensation standards [51] .
Labor representatives also understood that if they could universally recapture the right of the injured worker to sue an employer whose violation of a safety statute had caused an injury or occupational disease, the preventive effect of the promulgation of federal standards would be augmented. Such a provision was favored by labor spokesmen who met in Washington, D.C., on December 8, 1969, to plan their campaign for a "new" occupational safety and health act. The provision, however, was never seriously considered by congressional sponsors of the bills introduced in 1970. Labor knew its history but could not, in this instance, prevent history from repeating itself [52] .
The writings of experts on occupational diseases and disease compensation clearly explained, and labor spokesmen understood, that the monies paid out for workers' compensation, and even modest awards in tort actions, frequently were not enough, by themselves, to provide safety incentives for disease prevention that were comparable to the incentives they provided for accident prevention. The long period between exposure and the onset of many occupational diseases made it difficult to convince corporation managers looking at quarterly or annual balance sheets to accept the dictum that "safety paid." This is why organized labor devoted a great deal of energy to improving the quality of health and safety standards, to getting more health and safety inspectors through federal action, to obtaining stiff fines for health and safety law infractions, and to empowering federal authorities to act expeditiously to halt production at work sites with hazards that seriously threatened the well-being of human labor [53] .
There was-and still is-a cruel irony involved in this biologically/ technologically dictated strategy. The combination of government-mandated health and safety standards with workplace inspection is often the most effective way to prevent the contraction of occupational diseases. But it is an approach that workers historically have frequently found wanting, since it is so vulnerable to discretionary decisions by inspectors and administrators who are not selected by workers, are not production workers and are vulnerable to political pressure from employers.
The OSH Act authorized stiff fines, $1000 per citation, which were much higher than any state fines, for violations of federal safety and health standards and especially for failure to correct violations written up during OSHA inspections. It also led to the funding of more than a thousand new federal health and safety inspectors. But the nation still lacked enough health and safety inspectors. As noted earlier in this article, most large businesses had operations that were so complex and variable that they required constant supervision. Small businesses, especially, could not be covered adequately without additional staffing. Historically, such businesses had often not been inspected; many still were not covered by state compensation laws. Workers in those firms had a higher chance of becoming ill or being injured than did workers in larger companies.
Labor spokesmen understood that the effective monitoring of exposure to toxins, and consistent action to avoid mechanical accidents and explosions, required a regular presence, at the point of production, of some authority who could spot immediate hazards. Many serious hazards would not be seen during random safety inspections because in many workplaces conditions in the work environment are dynamic, changing as new structures, machinery, chemicals and procedures are utilized and as there are variations in plant temperatures and the quality of materials used in production. In Sweden this condition has been acknowledged by legislation (1974) authorizing elected safety stewards. U.S. unions knew this approach was a pipe dream. But their lobbying led the OSH Act to give workers the right to accompany OSHA inspectors during their examination of the workplace.
In Sweden in 1969, a massive wave of wildcat strikes, initiated by miners, put strong pressure on the government to enact new health and safety legislation that gave workers a greater role in protecting themselves. The 1974 Swedish law established worker-management safety committees with worker majorities that had the right to shut down dangerous work operations. They could be overruled by a government inspector, but if this happened, there would be no penalty. The Swedish law also has a provision that allows workers to quit work on the grounds that a severe hazard exists. During negotiations on the shape of the OSH Act; a similar provision was dropped from the American law [54] .
American unions wanted OSHA inspectors to have the right to shut down a work operation immediately if they found an imminent hazard. They knew that the delay involved in securing a court order would undermine the effectiveness of any safety program, as it had in the Pennsylvania mines in the late nineteenth century. A 1966 Canadian law gave government inspectors this power and the 1977 U.S. Mine Safety and Health Act would have such a provision. But under the OSH Act, the secretary of labor had to go to court to close down a work operation. Organized labor's lobbying did lead to a provision in the OSH Act that allowed taking the secretary of labor to court if the latter "arbitrarily or capriciously" failed to take action to eliminate an imminent danger in the workplace [55] .
CREDIT WHERE CREDIT IS DUE
This analysis of the health and safety program advocated by AFL-CIO unions in the late 1960s reveals a multifaceted strategy, mixing direct worker/union action [56] (including tort suits and wildcat strikes), financial incentives and administrative remedies. The dynamics of business operation and managerial cultures, the character of workplace health and safety hazards, and the inevitable intrusion of politics into all administrative systems require a diversity of approaches if working people are to be protected adequately against occupational hazards. Unfortunately, organized labor lacked the political clout necessary to get Congress to adopt an aggressive, far-ranging worker health and safety program in 1970 [57] .
In 1988 a British study of industrial safety and health, prepared by a team of academic public policy specialists, endorsed a mixture of economic incentives and worker empowerment that was similar, with the exception of the use of the wildcat strike, to the remedies that have been sought and utilized by organized labor in the United States during the last one hundred years [58] . Throughout the last century organized labor has done more than any other interest group in the United States to improve the occupational health and safety of working people.
ORIGINS OF THE OSH ACT / 295

